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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/067,741	02/08/2002	Katherine Galvin	MPI95-001CP1CP1CNIM	9620

7590                    09/22/2003

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP  
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[REDACTED] EXAMINER

PARAS JR, PETER

[REDACTED] ART UNIT

[REDACTED] PAPER NUMBER

1632

DATE MAILED: 09/22/2003

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

<b>Office Action Summary</b>	<b>Application No.</b>	<b>Applicant(s)</b>	
	10/067,741	GALVIN ET AL.	
	<b>Examiner</b>	<b>Art Unit</b>	
	Peter Paras, Jr.	1632	

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

#### Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133).
- Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

#### Status

- 1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_.
- 2a) This action is FINAL.      2b) This action is non-final.
- 3) Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

#### Disposition of Claims

- 4) Claim(s) 1-13 and 26-28 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) Claim(s) 1-13 and 26-28 is/are rejected.
- 7) Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

#### Application Papers

- 9) The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) The drawing(s) filed on 08 February 2002 is/are: a) accepted or b) objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
- 11) The proposed drawing correction filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is: a) approved b) disapproved by the Examiner.  
If approved, corrected drawings are required in reply to this Office action.
- 12) The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner.

#### Priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 119 and 120

- 13) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).  
a) All b) Some \* c) None of:  
1. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.  
2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.  
3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).  
\* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.
- 14) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) (to a provisional application).  
a) The translation of the foreign language provisional application has been received.
- 15) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120 and/or 121.

#### Attachment(s)

- 1) Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)      4) Interview Summary (PTO-413) Paper No(s). \_\_\_\_\_.  
2) Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)      5) Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)  
3) Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449) Paper No(s) 0202.      6) Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

## **DETAILED ACTION**

Applicant's preliminary amendment filed on 2/8/02 has been entered. Claims 1-3, 4, 6, 10 and 26 have been amended. Claims 14-25 and 29-33 have been cancelled. Claims 1-13 and 26-28 are pending and are under current consideration.

### ***Specification***

Applicant is reminded of the proper language and format for an abstract of the disclosure.

The abstract should be in narrative form and generally limited to a single paragraph on a separate sheet within the range of 50 to 150 words. It is important that the abstract not exceed 150 words in length since the space provided for the abstract on the computer tape used by the printer is limited. The form and legal phraseology often used in patent claims, such as "means" and "said," should be avoided. The abstract should describe the disclosure sufficiently to assist readers in deciding whether there is a need for consulting the full patent text for details.

The language should be clear and concise and should not repeat information given in the title. It should avoid using phrases which can be implied, such as, "The disclosure concerns," "The disclosure defined by this invention," "The disclosure describes," etc.

The instantly filed abstract appears to have exceeded 150 words. Appropriate correction is required.

### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101***

35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

Claims 1-4 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. Claims 1-4 are directed to a transgenic animal,

the scope of which encompasses a human being. A human being is non-statutory subject matter. As such, the recitation of the limitation "non-human" would be remedial for claim 35. See 1077 O.G. 24, April 21, 1987.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph***

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 1-13 and 26-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, because the specification, while being enabling for a homozygous transgenic mouse whose germ cells comprise a mutated rchd534-LacZ gene which lacks the MH2 domain encoding region, wherein the endogenous wild-type rchd534 gene of said mouse has been replaced with said mutated rchd534-LacZ gene which lacks the MH2 domain encoding region, and wherein said mouse displays a cardiovascular disease symptom as follows: hyperplasia, thickening of at least one cardiac valve, cardiac outflow tract development defects, cardiovascular calcification, epicardial vascular malformations, endocardial vascular malformation, or defects in the regulation of vascular tone, and methods of making and using the same, does not reasonably provide enablement for all other transgenic animals embraced by the claims. The specification does not enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the invention commensurate in scope with these claims.

The claims are directed to a homozygous transgenic animal having a mutated rcdh534 gene, wherein the wild-type rchd534 gene has been replaced with a rchd534-

lacZ gene, which lacks the MH2 domain encoding region, and wherein said animal displays a cardiovascular disease symptom. The claims are further directed to cells isolated from the same transgenic animals, methods of making the same transgenic animals and methods of using the same transgenic animals.

The specification teaches the generation of transgenic mice by disruption of the endogenous rchd534 gene, the disruption comprising replacing said endogenous rchd534 gene with a mutated rchd534-LacZ gene, which lacks the MH2 domain encoding region. The specification teaches that these knockout mice when homozygous for the disruption exhibit cardiovascular disease symptoms as follows: hyperplasia, thickening of at least one cardiac valve, cardiac outflow tract development defects, cardiovascular calcification, epicardial vascular malformations, endocardial vascular malformation, or defects in the regulation of vascular tone. While the specification has taught the generation of such a homozygous transgenic knockout mouse, the specification has not taught the generation of the other transgenic non-human animals encompassed by the claims. The working examples, guidance and relevant teachings provided by the instant specification are directed to the creation of the above transgenic mouse but do not support the creation of other transgenic non-human animals encompassed by the claims.

The following aspect of the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph is directed to claims 1-5, 6-13, and 26-28 as they read on the use embryonic stem cells for the creation of transgenic knockout non-human animals:

Both the specification and the state of the art have taught that the transgenic knockout technology requires the use of embryonic stem cells that have been genetically manipulated to comprise a disruption in a nucleotide sequence of interest. The specification has not taught creation of a transgenic knockout non-human animal by methods that do not require embryonic stem cells. Presently, the transgenic knockout technology is limited to the mouse system. See below.

With regard to the claim breadth directed to transgenic animals, the specification fails to teach the production of any transgenic animal comprising a disruption in an rchd534 gene other than the transgenic knockout mouse recited above. It is well known in the knockout art that the production of knockout animals other than mice is undeveloped. This is because ES cell technology is generally limited to the mouse system, at present, and that only "putative" ES cells exist for other species. See Moreadith et al. at page 214, Summary. Seemark (Reproductive Fertility and Development, 1994) supports this observation by reporting that totipotency for ES cell technology in many livestock species has not been demonstrated (page 6, Abstract). Likewise, Mullins et al. (Journal of Clinical Investigation, 1996) state that "although to date chimeric animals have been generated from several species including the pig, in no species other than the mouse has germline transmission of an ES cell been successfully demonstrated." (page S38, column 1, first paragraph). As the claims are directed to transgenic animals (claims 1-4) or cells obtained from a transgenic animal (6-9) or a method of making a transgenic animal (claims 10-13), which must be generated by the introduction of a transgene into an ES cell, or methods of using a

transgenic animal (claims 26-28) the state of the art supports that only mouse ES cells were available for use for production of transgenic mice. Finally, claim 13 is appropriately rejected, as the steps of the method require introducing a targeting construct into any embryonic cell. Given the unpredictable state of the art it would have required undue experimentation for the skilled artisan to create transgenic knockout non-human animals of species other than the mouse.

Therefore, in view of the quantity of experimentation necessary to determine the parameters listed above for the production of transgenic non-human animals comprising a disruption in a rchd534 gene, the lack of direction or guidance provided by the specification for the production of transgenic non-human animals comprising a disruption in a rchd534 gene, the absence of working examples for the demonstration or correlation to the production of a transgenic knockout non-human animal that exhibits a phenotype other than the exemplified mouse, the undeveloped art pertaining to the establishment of true embryonic stem (ES) cells of animal species other than mouse, and the breadth of the claims drawn to all non-human animals, it would have required undue experimentation for one skilled in the art to make and/or use the claimed invention.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph***

The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

Claims 1-13 and 26-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

Claims 1, 10, and 26 are unclear as written. Claims 1, 10, and 26 embrace a transgenic non-human animal having a mutated rchd534 gene, wherein the wild-type rchd534 gene has been replaced with an rchd534-LacZ gene, which lacks the MH2 domain encoding region. The claims are unclear as written because it is not clear that the mutated rchd534 gene is the same as the rchd534-LacZ gene and because it is not clear that the endogenous wild-type rchd534 gene has been replaced. The specification has defined the mutated rchd534 gene as being an rchd534-LacZ gene. The specification has defined the exemplified transgenic mouse as one whose endogenous wild-type rchd534 gene was replaced with the mutated rchd534-LacZ gene. Appropriate correction is required. Claims 2-9 depend from claim 1, claims 11-13 depend from claim 10, and claims 27-28 depend from claim 26.

### ***Double Patenting***

The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. See *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and, *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent is shown to be commonly owned with this application. See 37 CFR 1.130(b).

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

Claims 1-13 and 26-28 are rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-11 of U.S. Patent No. 6,359,194. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because both sets of claims encompass the same transgenic animals (including cells isolated therefrom, and methods of making and using the same transgenic animals), particularly a mouse. The transgenic animals as claimed in the instant application embrace the genus of animals while the claims of US 6,359,194 are directed to a species of animal, a mouse. Therefore, the claims directed to the transgenic mouse would anticipate the claims directed to transgenic animals.

### **Conclusion**

**No claim is allowed.**

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner(s) should be directed to Peter Paras, Jr., whose telephone number is 703-308-8340. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday from 8:30 to 4:30 (Eastern time).

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Deborah Reynolds, can be reached at 703-305-4051. Papers related to this application may be submitted by facsimile transmission. Papers should be faxed via the PTO Fax Center located in Crystal Mall 1. The faxing of such papers must conform with the notice published in the Official Gazette, 1096 OG 30 (November 15, 1989). The CM1 Official Fax Center number is (703) 872-9306.

Inquiries of a general nature or relating to the status of the application should be directed to Dianiece Jacobs whose telephone number is (703) 305-3388.

Peter Paras, Jr.

**PETER PARAS**  
**PATENT EXAMINER**

Art Unit 1632

